The threats of the Trump administration to send National Guard troops into Chicago to quell the city’s high crime have drawn sharp rebukes from Gov. JB Pritzker.

In an earlier era, troops were shipped to Chicago to restore order after the epic Chicago Fire, and the governor from Illinois was never consulted.

John McAuley Palmer, who served from 1869-73, was in office during the fire on Oct. 8, 1871, which leveled 17,450 buildings and 73 miles of streets in a four-block area, leaving 100,000 people homeless.

U.S. Army troops were later ordered to Chicago to aid the crisis, but the courtesy of informing the governor was ignored, much to Palmer’s disgust.

Sending National Guard troops to Chicago is nothing new; it’s actually been done 18 times since 1877. National Guard members have been shipped to the city to assist in various times of crisis, including a national rail strike in 1877, the Pullman Co. strike of 1894, and the race riots of 1919.

Other instances include the violence surrounding the 1968 Democratic National Convention, the assassination of Martin Luther King, and the infamous Days of Rage in 1969. The death of George Floyd and the verdict against Derek Chauvin also saw National Guard troops in Chicago. Even happier times, like the celebrations of the Chicago Bulls’ NBA title in 1997, brought in the military.

The Chicago Fire was different in that U.S. Army troops were sent in, rather than state troops, and it was in response to one of the great catastrophes in American history. But Palmer, the governor of Illinois, was stiffed in the bargain.

Palmer had been decisively elected as a Republican in 1868. He was returning to Springfield from a visit to Carlinville, where he had lived from 1838-67, when he learned of the fire.

Always known for his compassion, Palmer quickly directed his secretary, Brig. Gen. E.B. Harlan, to go to Chicago immediately with $5,000 from the governor’s contingency fund, and learn more of the situation. The next day, three boxcar loads of provisions were shipped from Springfield to the crippled city.

On Oct. 10, two days after the fire, reports of rampant looting were received. Palmer again acted quickly, sending his adjutant general and three companies of state militia to halt the crimes.

Palmer, though, was not done. On Oct. 13, he called a special session of the legislature and made nearly $3 million in financial relief – a huge sum for the time – available for Chicago. Though there was doubt that such a move was permitted under the state constitution, Palmer apparently pulled strings to show how it could be done.

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While Palmer’s actions were prudent, no one in the federal government seemed to listen or care. Upon arriving in Chicago, the adjutant general and the state militia were promptly placed under the command of Lt. Gen. Philip Sheridan, a Civil War hero and high-ranking member of the Regular Army.

Palmer ventured to Chicago, but before he arrived, Mayor Roswell B. Mason issued a proclamation giving the preservation of order to Sheridan. The governor then met with Mason and Sheridan, though no mention of the proclamation was made.

Satisfied with the situation and believing order had been restored, Palmer returned to Springfield. Several days later, on Oct. 17, Palmer learned of Mason’s proclamation and of Sheridan’s assertion that he had the right to command the Illinois militia. Palmer fired off a letter to Mason, ripping him for using federal troops without the governor’s consent.

The tension worsened when a 20-year-old college student under Sheridan’s command, who was on volunteer curfew duty, shot and killed Thomas Grosvenor, a former colonel from Illinois in the Civil War. The incident was 3 miles from the center of the fire damage.

Incensed, Palmer went back to Chicago to gather facts, then demanded that both the young man and Sheridan be indicted. The grand jury, though, refused any indictments and even praised Sheridan’s presence in the city.

They weren’t alone; many others viewed Sheridan, as one account states, the “savior of the city.” Both the press and the public in Chicago sided with Sheridan, and Palmer was bitterly criticized.

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For Palmer, the saga wasn’t over. After the federal troops left, a local relief agency asked Sheridan to bring back four companies of Army troops. The Commanding General of the U.S. Army, William Tecumseh Sherman, directed the troops to Chicago for an indefinite length of service in a police role.

It was an unusual move, since order had apparently been restored. Palmer, still stinging from the first episode, was livid at the latest order to send in troops.

His emotions likely stemmed from the late war. Palmer was one of the highest-ranking volunteer officers from Illinois, rising to major general and corps commander. Many have lauded Palmer’s ability in the field.

However, like many volunteers, Palmer clashed with West Pointers, including Sherman and Sheridan. Though Palmer was beloved by his men, he actually liked few generals, and often complained of them in letters to President Lincoln, a personal friend.

Palmer once referred to Sheridan as “a humbug” who “gained more by his pretense than his actions” on the battlefield. Palmer also believed that Sherman (and many other generals) did not care about losing their men in battle. In 1864, Palmer had resigned his command under Sherman in a dispute over rank with a fellow corps commander.

Palmer fired off a letter to President Ulysses S. Grant, another general whom he had criticized during the war, arguing that the sending of federal troops into Chicago on police duty was unconstitutional. One account described Grant as “evasive,” which is no surprise; Grant and Sherman were close friends from the conflict.

Grant added that the magnitude of the fire disaster justified the federal troops. Palmer replied that the orders for the troops to act as police were done “without reflection” and that the government must modify the orders “to prohibit their employment as police.”

Again, Grant sidestepped the issue. Palmer then sent the matter to the General Assembly as a special message, hoping for some satisfaction. The legislature, though, also went against Palmer. Resolutions of praise for both the governor and Sheridan were tabled. Palmer’s own party broke with him in a vote refusing to support the printing of his special message.

In his 1941 biography of his grandfather, George Thomas Palmer writes that the governor “never ceased to feel resentment and humiliation” from the incident. It was a driving factor in Palmer’s decision to refuse a certain re-nomination for governor in 1872 – a move that is practically unheard of, then and now.

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Was Palmer right? Scholars, past and present, are divided on the issue. A contemporary of Palmer, five-time U.S. Senator Shelby Cullom, declared that Palmer “acted with the poorest kind of judgment” for blasting “the splendid work which the troops were doing.” Cullom may have been biased; like many others, he adored Grant.

On the other side was Norman Jones, a state supreme court justice from Carrollton, who pointed out that “the troops were not there to protect federal property or to aid the national government in the performance of a federal function. A study of the record makes it plain that Palmer was right.”

Palmer is widely considered among the best governors of Illinois’ history, and his personal honesty is an anomaly in the sordid world of Illinois politics; he was practically untouched by scandal, and even political enemies like Cullom conceded Palmer’s integrity.

But the controversy surrounding the governor’s role – or lack thereof – in the Chicago Fire aftermath is a defining episode in his administration.

• Tom Emery is a freelance writer and historical researcher from Carlinville, Illinois. He may be reached at 217-710-8392 or ilcivilwar@yahoo.com.